In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reformed shareholder voting by eliminating uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We use this reform as a quasi-natural experiment to assess the value of shareholder empowerment. Using different control groups and various cross-sectional tests, we find that the reform did not increase average equity values.
Introduction
The right to elect the board of directors is perhaps the most fundamental right of shareholders in a corporation. In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) banned broker votes for the elections of directors.
1 Prior to the reform, registered brokers were allowed to vote at their discretion in director elections if their clients had not given them voting instructions before the annual meeting. Historically, such uninstructed broker votes were almost always cast in favor of management's nominees and amounted to approximately 11 to 14% of the votes cast (Bethel and Gillian, 2002) . The stated goal of the reform was to improve corporate governance by making board elections more competitive.
For research in corporate governance the elimination of broker voting is of great interest because it provides a quasi-natural experiment to estimate the effect (if any) of shareholder empowerment on equity values. On the one hand, the reform may be beneficial for shareholders because it gives them more power to hold boards accountable in elections. On the other hand, both empirical and theoretical research recognizes that shareholder empowerment may be costly. For example, investors may lack relevant information, their intervention might discourage managerial initiative, or they might pursue specific agendas. In a survey article, Yermack (2010) discusses the costs and benefits of shareholder empowerment and conjectures that the elimination of broker voting is a major governance reform that, together with two other reforms (of voting standards and proxy access), will make shareholder voting more effective.
Understanding the costs and benefits of shareholder empowerment is not only impor- 1 The final release by the SEC is available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf.
tant for academics but also for practitioners. Indeed, the reform of broker voting received widespread attention and support by market participants, the business press, and by policy makers. In 2007, the Wall Street Journal (Scannell, 2007) wrote that "investors ... may soon get a boost, as the role of shareholder votes cast by brokers comes under closer scrutiny."
The Council of Institutional Investors declared in 2009 that "this long overdue reform is needed now more than ever" and proxy advisor firms Glass Lewis and ISS were also strongly supporting the rule change. 2 In addition, the U.S. House of Representatives exposed the SEC to political pressure.
3
We contribute to the literature on corporate governance by estimating the stock market's response to the elimination of broker voting in director elections. We consider nine important dates in the period between 2003 and 2009 that increased or decreased the probability that the reform would be implemented and run an event study using two different control groups. Our results suggest that the reform did not increase shareholder value. In almost all specifications we fail to find any valuation effect. In the few specifications that yield significant results, abnormal stock returns are negative. Moreover, in a cross-sectional analysis we examine subsets of firms for whom the reform was likely to be most relevant and again find no increase in value for these firms. Overall, our findings suggest that the reform was not effective and did not benefit shareholders.
Our paper is closely related to other recent studies of governance reforms. A contemporaneous working paper by Anderson and Nayar (2013) also examines the elimination of broker voting. They focus on six dates and find that the reform had a value-neutral effect on five of their six event dates, which is consistent with our results. 4 
Timeline of the Change in Broker Voting Regulation
Rule 452 of the New York Stock Exchange allows brokers to vote at their discretion at annual meetings on "routine" proposals if they have not received voting instructions from their clients. 5 Uncontested director elections were considered to be a "routine" matter until 2009, when the SEC approved a NYSE proposal that classified uncontested elections as "nonroutine," thus eliminating broker votes. The reform became effective for annual meetings on or after January 1, 2010. 4 Our methodology differs from theirs in several respects. While they, like us, consider a global market index as a control group, we moreover use a second control group, the returns of firms registered under the Investment Act of 1940. The latter type of firms was exempted from the rule change due to an amendment filed by the NYSE with the SEC on May 27, 2007. A second difference between the studies concerns the choice of reform-related event dates. While we consider nine event dates leading up to the rule change, they focus on six dates, including some of the same dates examined by us.
5 NYSE Rule 452 lists "non-routine" matters on which brokers cannot vote without instructions from clients such as contested director elections and merger proposals. In the following year, the reform process slowed down. 
Here, r pt is the day t return on the equally-weighted portfolio p and r m,t is the contemporaneous return of the control group. D e is a dummy variable that equals one (minus one)
for any event e that increases (decreases) the probability of the rule change, and equals zero otherwise.
When using the global index as a control group, we modify the Schipper and Thompson (1983) specification by including lead and lagged market returns, which mitigates the potential bias from non-synchronous trading due to time differences between countries in our global market index. We obtain the time series data of the Dow Jones Global ex-U.S. Table III shows that the overall reaction to the rule change is not statistically significant when using the global index. The coefficient of the daily abnormal return is close to zero and the p-value is 0.804. To examine the wealth effects in more detail, Panel B reports the abnormal returns for each separate event date described in Table I (by letting the dummy De equal one for one particular event at a time).
We do not find statistically significant abnormal returns on any of the event days.
Next, we use our second control group, the equally-weighted returns of a sample of 372 listed companies that fall under the Investment Act of 1940. We obtain this sample by collecting closed-end funds from CRSP and we focus on the last four event dates as explained above. 8 Panel C documents a negative overall wealth effect that is weakly statistically significant. When we examine the events separately in Panel D, we only find a statistically significant effect for event 8, relating to the date that the rule was published for comments by the SEC, after it had appeared to be stuck. The effect of this event on abnormal stock returns is negative. In unreported tests we redo the entire analysis in Table III Although overall wealth effects seem to be insignificant, a subsample of firms may be affected by the rule change. We examine the effect of the following eight variables on crosssectional abnormal returns on the nine event dates. The elimination of broker voting is likely to be more relevant for firms with a higher percentage of broker votes (1), for firms in which average director approval rates are low (2) (since the reform makes it easier to vote a director off the board), and for firms with a majority voting standard (3). 9 Firms with weak This table presents daily abnormal returns around events related to changes in the rules for broker discretionary voting. The event window is [−1, 1]. In Panel A, we report overall daily abnormal returns of our sample of S&P 500 firms on the nine event dates as reported in Table I , with a global index (the Dow Jones Global Ex. U.S. index) as benchmark. In Panel B, we report the abnormal returns per event. Panel C shows the overall wealth effects when we use the returns of companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 as a benchmark. In Panel D we report the abnormal returns per event. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. shareholder rights (4), as measured by a high score on the entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al., 2009) , and small firms (5) are also more likely to be affected by the rule change. Regarding the latter variable, opponents of the reform have argued that the exclusion of broker votes will make it harder for firms to obtain a necessary quorum, forcing them to devote resources towards soliciting shareholder votes. This effect would disproportionally hurt small firms.
We also examine the possibility that the reform mattered more for poorly performing firms (6) or for firms with larger institutional ownership (7). Finally, the relevance of the rule change might depend on the extent of product market competition (8) . Giroud and Mueller (2010) suggest that corporate governance might not matter for firms in very competitive industries because market pressure serves as a disciplining device.
For cross-sectional analyses, Sefcik and Thompson (1986) provide a weighting procedure that controls for cross-correlation and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity in firm residuals. We follow their procedure and form a matrix F that has a column of ones and P − 1 columns of characteristics. In our case, P equals nine as we examine eight firm characteristics. We then form P sets of portfolio weights and compute the portfolio returns for each set of weights as follows:
where W is a P xN matrix of portfolio weights, W k is the k th row of portfolio weights, and F plus-resignation voting standard being in between. is an N xP matrix. We obtain the return on portfolio p on day t by R pt = W p R it , in which R it is an N x1 vector of individual firms' stock returns on day t. Finally, we run p portfolio time-series regressions by using Equation 1. The estimates from the regressions reflect the effect of each firm characteristic on the overall market reaction to the nine events, while controlling for the effects of other firm characteristics. 
Conclusion
We study a reform that received widespread attention by academics and practitioners, namely the elimination of broker voting in director elections. We document that the reform did not increase equity values. The effect is value-neutral and in some specifications even 
